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Abstract—Content-Based Image Retrieval (CBIR) techniques have been widely researched and in service with the help of cloud
computing like Google Images. However, the images always contain rich sensitive information. In this case, the privacy protection
become a big problem as the cloud always can’t be fully trusted. Many privacy-preserving image retrieval schemes have been
proposed, in which the image owner can upload the encrypted images to the cloud, and the owner himself or the authorized user can
execute the secure retrieval with the help of cloud. Nevertheless, few existing researches notice the multi-source scene which is more
practical. In this paper, we analyze the difficulties in Multi-Source Privacy-Preserving Image Retrieval (MSPPIR). Then we use the
image in JPEG-format as the example, to propose a scheme called JES-MSIR, namely a novel JPEG image Encryption Scheme which
is made for Multi-Source content-based Image Retrieval. JES-MSIR can support the requirements of MSPPIR, including the
constant-rounds secure retrieval from multiple sources and the union of multiple sources for better retrieval services. Experiment
results and security analysis on the proposed scheme show its efficiency, security and accuracy.
Index Terms—Searchable encryption, Privacy-preserving retrieval, Content-based image retrieval.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
IMAGING device has rapidly become stronger and cheaperwith the development of semiconductor technology. In
this case, more and more high-resolution images are gener-
ated by people from all walks of life every day. The need
for efficient storage and retrieval of images is more urgent
by the increment of large-scale image databases among all
kind of areas. The development of cloud computing brings
suitable solution to the computation-intensive and storage-
intensive image retrieval task, and many excellent image
retrieval schemes [1] have been proposed to put the CBIR
into practical applications like Google Search By Image [2].
However, the images always contain rich sensitive infor-
mation. What’s more, in many cases, images are copyright
restricted and the owners hope to profit from them by
providing CBIR service. Therefore, it is unsafe to directly
upload the unencrypted images to the cloud, which makes
us drop into the dilemma between the image retrieval and
image security. Many prior works in the field of privacy-
preserving CBIR (PPCBIR) have paid their attention to this
problem. Briefly speaking, the image owner can upload
the encrypted image features or the encrypted images to
the Cloud Server (CS), and the CS can execute similarity
computation between the encrypted data. A typical system
model is shown as Fig. 1.
It should be noticed that most of existing schemes have
a common limitation that they only consider the single-
source (i.e., single image owner) case [3], where the image
owner executes the authorizing and the authorized user
retrieve the encrypted images of this owner with the help
of CS. However, in real-world applications, image retrieval
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Fig. 1: The system model with a single image owner.
task is more likely to get multiple image sources involved.
Firstly, the users of PPCBIR always hope that they can
get more comprehensive search results. It is obviously that
multi-source can cope with this problem better. Secondly,
the image owners can enhance their competitiveness by
uniting and providing their services to the authorized users
together. Last but not least, the CS is more willing to server
for multi-source to enhance the stability and profitability as
they can provide more computation and storage services.
The joint demand of all entities makes multi-source an in-
dispensable choice. Some recent works [3]–[5] have noticed
the significant meaning of these scenes, however, to the
best of our knowledge, no existing paper comprehensively
considers MSPPIR and gives the scheme in a safe and
efficient way.
It is clear that CBIR is a real-time task. However, to
ensure the image security, especially in the multi-source
scene, is quite a challenge to the efficiency. In addition, as the
image encrypted in spatial domain cannot be compressed
a lot, two PPCBIR works [6], [7] try to encrypt images in
JPEG-domain. However, these schemes still suffer from the
problems like feature leakage, index lacking, etc.
To address these challenges, we propose a new secure
scheme JES-MSIR for MSPPIR, in which we consider two
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basic requirements that are different from the scenario with
a single image owner. In total, the contributions of this paper
can be summarized as follows:
1) We formally defined the MSPPIR problem in terms
of functionality and security. Firstly, the authorized
user should be able to execute the retrieval from
all the owners, who authorize to him, with constant
(i.e. irrelevant to the number of owners) rounds of
communication to the CS. Secondly, a part of owners
should be able to unite as a group to provide the
retrieval service together. Finally, the security should
be considered under the reasonable treat model.
2) We propose a novel scheme which can support MSP-
PIR efficiently. The permutations are used to ensure
the security and accuracy. The property of permu-
tation is further exploited to deal with the collusion
problem and support the union of sources. The im-
age encrypted is conducted with the quantized DCT
coefficients in JPEG-format images to avoid the file
expansion. The bag-of-words (BOW) and multiple
permutations are utilized to cope with the prob-
lems like low retrieval efficiency and feature leakage
in the existing JPEG-domain single-source PPCBIR
schemes.
3) We make detailed experiments on two real-world
image databases. It is shown that the efficiency and
retrieval accuracy of our scheme is better than the
existing schemes which just partly support multi-
source, and the security is on par with the existing
PPCBIR schemes.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2
summaries the related works, specially, we give the explana-
tions about why most of the single-source schemes are not
suitable for the multi-source scene. Section 3 introduce the
system architecture and preliminaries. The detailed scheme
design is presented in Section 4 and Section 5. The Section
6 gives the security analysis. Experiments and results are
presented in Section 7. Finally, conclusions are made in
Section 8.
2 RELATED WORK
Existing schemes on PPCBIR can be briefly classified into
two categories. In the first category, the image owner firstly
extracts the aggregated feature from plaintext image, then
use specific encryption methods to encrypt the feature or
index. The image owner uploads the encrypted features and
encrypted images to CS at last. CS can execute the retrieval
in encrypted domain with specific similarity measurement
methods. In the second category, the owner just needs
to encrypt the image, the tasks of feature extraction and
index building are all undertaken by CS, which makes an
ideal environment for MSPPIR. The kernel difference is that
feature extracted before or after the encrypted image upload
and we detailedly discuss these schemes in the follow.
2.1 Feature-encryption based schemes
Due to the feature extraction task undertaken by the owner,
the kernel task of schemes in first category is constructing a
function encryption on the feature to make the distance be-
tween encrypted features valid. The methods can be broadly
divided into two classes [8]: those based on randomization
symmetric encryption techniques and those based on homo-
morphic encryption. To the best of our knowledge, Lu et al.
[9] proposed the first PPCBIR scheme over the encrypted
image database. The scheme uses min-hash algorithm and
order-preserving encryption to protect the visual words
which are utilized to represent the images. In the another
work, Lu et al. [10] investigates three image feature protec-
tion techniques including bit-plane randomization, random
projection and randomized unary encoding. Based on the
property of bit computation, the encrypted feature is still
valid for retrieval. Xia et al. [11] proposed a PPCBIR scheme
based on Scale-Invariant Feature Transformation (SIFT) [12]
features and Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD) [13]. The cal-
culation of EMD is in fact a linear program problem, and
a linear transformation was utilized to protect the privacy
information during the solution process of EMD problem.
Yuan et al. [14] designed an encrypted image search scheme
based on the secure KNN (k-nearest neighbors) [15] algo-
rithm and outsourced most of index building task to CS.
The above methods are all belong to the randomization
symmetric encryption techniques.
Homomorphic encryption (HE) technology is a cryp-
tography technology based on computational complexity
theory of mathematical problems. Some early works [16],
[17] considered the secure distance computation of feature
vector based on the Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption
(SHE) [18] which can support addition or multiplication
on ciphertext, however, they are not a practical scheme in
the PPCBIR as they expose part of plaintext feature. To
the best of our knowledge, Lu et al. [8] firstly pointed out
that the SHE methods can’t complete the secure retrieval
without the interactions with the authorized user. They
further prove that although CS can execute the retrieval
based on Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) [19] tech-
nology which can support the addition and multiplication
on ciphertext, the time and storage consumption are far
more than the methods based on randomization distance-
preserving encryption. The other schemes [3], [4] in this type
will be detailed described later.
2.2 Image-encryption based schemes
The strategies in the first category suffer from a common
disadvantage. As the big volume of storage and large com-
putation complexity, both the image feature extraction and
index construction are resource-consuming operations. In
this case, the researchers try to outsource the feature extrac-
tion task to the cloud, which brings up the methods in the
second category. Similar to the first category, the methods
in second category can be briefly classified into two classes.
The first one tries to extract the encrypted classic feature
(e.g., SIFT) from the encrypted images through SHE technol-
ogy, and the second uses invariant statistics as the feature
based on random encryption. To our knowledge, Hsu et
al. [20] was the first to investigate privacy-preserving SIFT
in the encrypted domain by utilizing Paillier cryptosystem.
However, their scheme is computationally intractable and
insecure [21]. The following schemes [22], [23] in this class
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try to improve their practicability by using two CS work col-
laboratively. In recent years, more researchers [24] try to use
pre-trained VGG16 as feature extractor to extract encrypted
feature. However, the time and storage consumption taken
by HE on image and plenty of interactions between servers
is still hard to accept. The kernel reason for high complexity
is large number of nonlinear feature extraction operations
on encrypted image.
The methods based on invariant statistics is the scheme
which users and CS are both low computational cost, and
it makes the scheme the most practical one. Ferreira et al.
[5] proposed a tailor-made Image Encryption Scheme called
IES-CBIR. In this scheme, random permutation is employed
to protect the value (i.e., color) information and the position
(i.e., texture) of image pixels is shuffled randomly. After en-
cryption, owner sends the encrypted images to CS. The HSV
(Hue-Saturation-Value) color histograms are extracted from
the encrypted images at the cloud server side. The similari-
ties between images can be directly measured by Hamming
distances between the corresponding histograms. However,
the global histogram is too rigid for image retrieval prob-
lems. Xia et al. [25] further extracted local histogram as the
local feature, and get better aggregating feature with the
help of BOW. However, the schemes in spatial domain will
destroy the image compression, and the encrypted images
have to be stored in lossless-compression format (PNG, zip),
thus it will bring the extra storage and time consumption.
A valid solution of this problem is to encrypt the image
in JPEG-domain, and keep the JPEG-format be hold after
the encryption. Zhang et al. [7] encrypts the JPEG image
by permuting the DCT coefficients of different blocks at the
same frequency position, and Cheng et al. [6] permutes the
entropy-coded segments in the JPEG bitstream. However,
these schemes exposed the feature of plaintext. To avoid
this problem, Liang et al. [26] encrypted the Huffman-code
histograms. However, their schemes are still fragile in the
Known-Background-Attack (KBA) model. What’s more, the
previous works in JPEG-domain did not give the feature
aggregation scheme, which will make the retrieval time
unacceptable.
2.3 Partly supported MSPPIR
Although most of the mainstream schemes in the PPCBIR
are mentioned above, few papers above considered the
scene of multi-source. A straightforward idea is extend-
ing existing schemes to multi-source scenario by executing
searching over encrypted images belong to different owners
one by one. However, it will introduce plenty of rounds
of communications between authorized users and CS. A
necessary improvement is performing multiple retrieval at
constant rounds (e.g., one interaction). However, in this case,
the randomization based scheme in the first category is vul-
nerable to malicious image owner. For example, the stream
cipher key is exposed when the attacker get the ciphertext
and its plaintext, which make the collusion between the
image owner and CS become threaten. Besides, the union
expansion of schemes in the first category is still an open
problem. The scheme based on classic feature extraction in
the second category is also unsuitable for the multi-source
expansion as the time-consumption will be more unaccept-
able. Some other methods unmentioned above like partial
encryption [27], [28] is also unsuitable for the scalability
in that the security risk in the single-source will be more
magnified.
To our knowledge, there are three existing schemes
which partly support the multi-source scene. Shen et al. [3]
firstly point out the significant meaning of retrieval multi-
source in one interaction, they propose a scheme called
MIPP based on the methods in secure multi-party compu-
tation (SMC) [29], which supports the sum of ciphertext is
same as the sum of plaintext. The scheme let each image
owner encrypt their feature vector by their own key and
use their sum as an evaluation of distance. To avoid the
interaction between the image owner and authorized user
during the retrieval, key management center (KMC) is in-
troduced to decrypt the image belong to image owner, then
encrypt it with the key from the authorized user. However,
on the one hand, this evaluation is not suitable for the image,
which make their retrieval accuracy not good. On the other
hand, the scheme exposes the sum of plaintext features to
the CS and expose the plaintext image to the KMC, which
make their scheme insecure. Zhang et al. [4] proposed a
feasible scheme called PIC based on multi-level FHE which
support the key conversion in the encrypted domain [30].
The CS and KMC both possess partial secret key. When an
user add into the system, the trusted party (TP) distribute
the secret key to the user, CS and KMC, which make the
ciphertext can be transformed to the same key by the collab-
orative computing. Although their scheme can get similar
accuracy with the plaintext, the time consumption caused
by multi-level FHE is unacceptable. Besides, the security of
this scheme is based on a global secret key, which make it
vulnerable to collusion attack (i.e., the collusion between the
CS and KMC). The above two schemes can be regarded as
the scheme in the first category and they only consider about
the scene about single user authorized by multi-source. In
[5], a brief discussion about the union between the owners
are given. In their scheme, an owner creates the repository,
when the other users join in, they need to use the repository
key to encrypt the pixel color features, and the users can
encrypt their pixel positions by their own. However, it will
make the image owner execute extra consumption when
they join in a repository. What’s more, the following paper
in the second category are all paying little attention to the
scene that users authorized by multi-source.
As the description above, existing schemes on MSPPIR
are suffering from the shortage on the accuracy, security,
efficiency and scalability. Inspired by existing schemes based
on invariant statistics in the second category, we propose a
novel system model in Section 3, and show the complete
scheme in Section 4 and Section 5 to cope with challenges
on multi-source PPCBIR scene.
3 SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
3.1 System model
Similar to [4] and [5], the proposed system involves five
types of entities, i.e., the image owner, the group, Cloud
Server (CS), Key Management Center (KMC) and the Au-
thorized User (AU), as shown in Fig. 2.
Image owner has a corresponding identity which can be
called as OID. Each image owner has a large-scale image
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Fig. 2: System model. In the figure, the process of
outsourcing images, authorizing users and user executes
query are shown.
database IOID = {Ii}nOIDi=1 . Each image belong to an owner
has a corresponding identity set IIDOID = {IIDi}nOIDi=1 ,
where the nOID means the number of the images the
owner has. To preserve the security of images, before
uploading, each owner generates an encrypted image set
C = {Ci}nOIDi=1 from IOID by image encryption.
Group with a group identity GID is an union of several
image owners. The goal of Group is to give better service for
the authorized users, which means after the user authorized
by the group, he can search all the images belong to the
image owners in the group without interaction with them.
The group organizer take the responsibility to authorize the
users and update the members. The group organizer should
be trusty to all the members in group. The group organizer
could be undertaken by a trusty member or trusty third
party.
Cloud Server stores the encrypted images from the
image owners and provides CBIR service for users.
What’more, the cloud server will further extract aggregate
feature from the encrypted images for the owner and group
to get better retrieval time.
Key Management Center takes the responsibility for
storing the key for each image and the authorized infor-
mation. When a owner adds a new encrypted image to the
CS or authorize a user, he will send a corresponding key
to key management center. Two keys will be got when the
group organizer authorize a new user. During the retrieval,
CS needs one interaction with KMC.
Authorized User with a corresponding identity called
as UID can be authorized by multiple owners/groups, and
they can get the retrieval results from all the authoring
sources with a single interaction. Authorized users need no
interactions with KMC.
As authentication information, CS and KMC have the
knowledge of OID (i.e., set of OID), GID (i.e., set of
GID) and UID (i.e., set of UID) and the authorization re-
lationship between them. In the rest of paper, for simplicity,
source is used to represent the image owner and the group.
3.2 Security model
Similar to previous schemes [4], [5], the honest-but-curious
CS and KMC are considered in our scheme, i.e., they will
follow the protocol specification, but may try their best to
harvest the content of the encrypted images. In general,
CS and KMC are well protected, so we don’t consider
compromise attack in this paper.
As we could set the CS and KMC in different service
providers (i.e., Google and Amazon) and the authorized
user will not interact with the KMC, we assume that it is
not possible to have an authorized user who collude with
both CS and KMC. Similar, as the union of group implies
the assumption owner in group is highly believable, we
assume both CS and KMC collude with an image owner in
one group is impossible. As the group organizer need not do
more thing besides key generation and distribution, we as-
sume the group organizer is trusty to all the members in the
group. Same as previous schemes [4], the collusion between
entities only include the existing information exchange, the
further defraud collaboratively is beyond consideration as it
is easy to be detected by other non-collusion server.
3.3 Preliminaries
3.3.1 Overview of JPEG encoding
JPEG is the most commonly used image format and account-
ing for up to 95% of the images in the web [31]. Generally
speaking, it will be faster to operate the JPEG image without
decoding. To better explain the image encryption and fea-
ture extraction operations, we here briefly introduce color
JPEG encoding.
As we all know, the color image is composed by a num-
ber of pixels which are represented by RGB values. Based
on the characteristics that human eyes are insensitive to
chrominance information and high frequency information,
the JPEG encoding firstly transforms the RGB information to
YUV pattern, then down-sampling the UV information (i.e.,
Y:U:V=4:1:1). Then the image is split to a series of 8×8 non-
overlapped blocks, and DCT transformation are executed
on each block. As a result, the RGB values in a block are
transformed as one DC value and 63 AC values. At last,
the quantization table are used to compress these values,
the higher frequency information which means the relativly
later part of AC values will be strongly squeezed, and most
of AC values will be squeezed to zero.
Due to the dependency of the adjacent image blocks,
the difference value between two sequential DCT blocks
is calculated to represent the DC value. Due to most of
the AC values is zero, the zig-zag scan and run-length
encoding are used to encode 63 AC values in each block.
For example, suppose the zig-zag sequence of a block is {3,-
8,0,-1,0,0,0,3,0,0,-4,EOB} that can be converted into serveral
(r, v) pairs: {(0,3), (0,-8), (1,-1), (3,3), (2,-4), (0,0)}, where r
denotes the number of zeros before a non-zero AC coef-
ficient whose value equals to v. The symbol EOB (End-Of-
Block) implies that all remaining AC coefficients in the block
are zero, and denotes as one specific pair (0,0). The huffman
code and VLI code table is finally used to encode the DC
difference value and (r, v) pairs with VLI code table shown
in Table 1, one VLI code is composed by the bit-stream and
the group it belong to. For simplicity, in the rest of paper,
the bit-stream of DC difference value will be called as DC,
and the group index of DC will be denoted as gDC . It is
easy to find that the DC and (r, v) pairs contains nearly all
the information of image.
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TABLE 1: Variable-Length Integer (VLI) coding table
Value v Group Index (Number of Bits) Binary Code
0 0 -
-1, 1 1 0,1
-3, -2, 2, 3 2 00, 01, 10, 11
-7, -6, -5, -4, 4, 5, 6, 7 3 000,001,010,011,100,101,110,111
-15, . . . ,-8, 8, . . . ,15 4 0000, 0001, . . . ,1110,1111
-31, . . . ,-16, 16, 31 5 000000, . . . ,111111
-63, . . . ,-32, 32, . . . ,63 6 0000000, . . . ,1111111
-127, . . . , -64, 64, . . . , 127 7 00000000, . . . ,11111111
-255, . . . , -128, 128, . . . ,255 8 00000000, . . . ,111111111
-511, . . . ,-129,129, . . . ,511 9 000000000, . . . ,1111111111
-1023, . . . ,-512,512, . . . ,1023 10 0000000000, . . . ,11111111111
. . . . . . . . .
3.3.2 Bag-of-word model
The CBIR technologies extract visual features to represent
the images. During the early stages of its development,
global features [32] are extracted from the image to perform
the retrieval. However, the global feature is always easy to
be affected by the illumination and rotation etc. The local
features (e.g., SIFT) are used to solve this problem. However,
the local features are always too large and instable, in
this case, the feature aggregation methods are gradually
developed. The BOW (Bag-Of-Word) [33] is one of the most
popular models. There are three steps in the BOW model:
(i) Local histogram extraction. The first step is to extract
local features from the images in database. The local fea-
ture(e.g. SIFT) is commonly used in the CBIR. However,
to encrypted images, on the one hand, the local feature is
not outstanding in low-resolution image without suitable
aggregation methods; on the other hand, non-linear dection
schemes local feature uses make the feature extraction from
encrypted image difficult [20], [22].
(ii) Vocabulary generation. The second step is to construct
the visual vocabulary. Typically, k-means method can be
employed to cluster the local features into k classes. The
cluster centers are defined as visual words. The full set of
the visual words constitute the vocabulary.
(iii) Histogram calculation. The last step is to calculate
the histogram of visual words. All the local features are
represented by their nearest visual words. Finally, each
image is represented by a k-bins histogram of visual words.
It should be noticed the position of the visual words have
been ignored in this way, and it give the space for the
encryption.
3.3.3 Permutation and Bitxor
The permutation encryption and bitxor encryption is widely
used in the encryption on features [9] and images [5], [6],
[25]. In these schemes, symmetric secret keys are used
during the encryption and decryption. The permutation-
based encryption and decryption is presented in algorithm
1 and algorithm 2.
For simplicity, the orderly sequence of positive integers
from 1 to N is denoted as EN . For example, E3 denotes the
sequence (1, 2, 3). In the existing schemes [5], [6], [10], [25],
the permutation key is used to encrypt the plaintext features
or images, which means input data of EncPerm can be seen
Algorithm 1 EncPerm
Input: Plaintext Data D = (d1, d2, . . . , dn), Permutation
key K = (k1, k2, . . . , kn)
Output: Encrypted Sequence C = (c1, c2, . . . , cn)
// di, ki, ci ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
1: for each i ∈ E do
2: ci = dki
3: end for
Algorithm 2 DecPerm
Input: Encrypted Data C = (c1, c2, . . . , cn), Decryption key
K = (k1, k2, . . . , kn)
Output: Plaintext Data D = (d1, d2, . . . , dn)
// di, ki, ci ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
1: for each i ∈ E do
2: dki = ci
3: end for
as E. To meet the needs of MSPPIR, the transformation
between secret keys are further considered. From the basic
properties of permutation group, it is easy to get formula 1.
EncPerm(DecPerm(K2,K1),EncPerm(K1,K))
= EncPerm(K2,K)
(1)
Specially, we can get formula 2 when we set K = E.
EncPerm(DecPerm(K2,K1),EncPerm(K1, E))
= EncPerm(K2, E)
(2)
It should be noticed that for each D, there is a corre-
sponding K can get the same DecPerm(D,K). The primary
fact means that it will be difficult to infer D or K from the
DecPerm(D,K) only. Based on same reason, it further im-
plies that exposed DecPerm(K2,K1) and EncPerm(K1,K)
will not leak the K , K1 and K2. It is easy to notice that the
BitXor (Bit-wise XOR) computation has the same property.
4 BASIC SCHEME
In this section, we only consider the scene the authorized
user search from multi-owners, the enhancement on security
and the scheme of group union will be given in the next
MSPPIR: MULTI-SOURCE PRIVACY-PRESERVING IMAGE RETRIEVAL IN CLOUD COMPUTING 6
section. The proposed scheme is given from the perspective
of different entities.
4.1 Owner Side
4.1.1 Image Key Generation
As mentioned in subsection 3.3.1, the JPEG-format image is
mainly made up of DC values and (r, v) pairs. Similar with
the image in spatial-domain, the image can be separated
into two kinds of information, i.e., value information and
position information. To protect the image content, we firstly
shuffled the non-overlapping blocks. Next the (r, v) pairs
in each block are shuffled to further protect the position
information. Finally, the v and DC values are substituted to
protect the value information.
The Kp is used to encrypt the position informa-
tion of image. In JPEG-domain, it contains the block
permutation, intra-block permutation and the bitstream
in one fix length. Accordingly, a pseudo-random per-
mutation generator, a stream-cipher generator and sev-
eral keys are used to protect the position informa-
tion, i.e., Kp = {RandPerm, StmCiph, {keyblo∗}∗∈{Y,U,V },
{keyinblo∗}∗∈{Y,U,V }, {keydc∗}∗∈{Y,U,V }}. For simplicity, all
the following ∗ represent an element in {Y, U, V }
The secret key {keyblo∗} is used to permute the blocks
in image from the range [1, . . . , blknum∗], the blknum∗ is
the number of non-overlapping blocks in the corresponding
color component. The random permutation is generated as
follow:
pmtb∗ ← RandPerm(keyblo∗, [1, . . . , blknum∗], IID). (3)
The secret keys {keyinblo∗} are used to generate random
permutations to shuffle (r, v) pairs in blocks. The random
permutations of three components are generated as follows:
{pmtp∗j} ← RandPerm(keyinblo∗,
[1, . . . , blksizej∗ ], IID, j∗),
(4)
where {blksizej∗} means the number of (r, v) pairs in j∗-th
block, j∗ ∈ [1, . . . , blknum∗].
Due to we need to control the bit-length of encrypted
DC for further retrieval, it is difficult to generate the
bitstream to encrypt DC before encryption. In this case,
we directly use keydc∗ to generate the encrypted DC, the
random bitstream is generated as follow:
{bitdc∗j} ← StmCiph(keydc∗,
[1, . . . , blksizej∗ ], IID, j∗).
(5)
Accordingly, a pseudo-random permutation generator
and several secret keys are used to protect the value infor-
mation, i.e., Kv = {RandPerm, {keyv∗}, {keyl∗}}.
The secret keys {keyv∗} are utilized to generate random
permutations to substitute the value of v in all the blocks.
As most absolute value of v is less than 10, the random
permutations are generated as follows:
{pmtv∗,#} ← RandPerm(keyv∗, [−10,−1] ∪ [1, 10]), (6)
here # ∈ {1, . . . , Npmt1}, Npmt1 is amount of the random
permutations for each color component. The permutations
ignore 0 due to the limitation of JPEG-decoding.
Algorithm 3 BlockPermut
Input: Image I , the corresponding IID and secret keys
{keyblo∗}
Output: Encrypted image I ′, {pmtb∗}
1: Parse the image, and denote the total number of blocks
in image I as blknum∗
2: Generate the secret permutation pmtb∗ whose size is
blknum∗
3: Denote the blocks in I as blk, denote the blocks in I ′ as
blk′
4: for ∀∗ ∈ Y,U, V do
5: for i = 1 : blknum∗ do
6: blk′∗ ← blk∗[pmtb∗[i]]
7: end for
8: end for
Algorithm 4 IntraBlockPermut
Input: Image I , the corresponding IID and secret keys
{keyblo∗}
Output: Encrypted image I ′,{pmtp∗}
1: Parse the image, and get the blocks denoted by blk∗
2: for ∗ ∈ {Y, U, V } do
3: for blk∗j ∈ blk∗ do
4: Generate the secret permutation for j-th block blk∗j
size of blksizej∗ as pmtp∗j
5: for blk∗j [i] ∈ blk∗j do
6: blk′∗j [i]← blk∗j [pmtp∗j [i]]
7: end for
8: end for
9: Denote all the pmtp∗j as {pmtp∗}
10: end for
The secret keys {keyl∗} are used to generate the random
permutations to substitute the gDC . As most gDC is less than
10, the random permutations are generated from the range
[0,9] as follows:
{pmtDCL∗,#} ← RandPerm(keyl∗, [0, 9]), (7)
here # ∈ {1, . . . , Npmt2}, Npmt2 is amount of the random
permutations for each color component. The encryption on
DC is determined by both {bitdc∗j} and {pmtDCL∗,#}
It should be noticed the Kv is unique for each owner, but
the Kp is one-time pad for each image.
4.1.2 Image Outsourcing
(C , ImgPosKey, ImgV alKey) ← ImgEnc(I , IID, Kv).
As presented above, three steps are contained in the image
encryption including block permutation, and intra-block
permutation, value substitution. For each step, we present a
sub-algorithm to specify its process(see Algorithm 3, 4 and
5).
As presented by Algorithm 3 and 4, we generate ran-
dom permutations to shuffle the block position and intra-
block (r, v) pairs. It should be noticed the permutations on
plaintext image is actually equal to execute the EncPerm
algorithm where one of the input can be seem as E. The
Algorithm 5 encrypts the v and DC by substituting values
with multiple tables. In this way, the same value at different
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Algorithm 5 ValueSubstitution
Input: Image I and secret keys {keyv∗}, {keyl∗} and keydc∗
Output: Encrypted image I ′, {pmtv∗,#} and
{pmtDCL∗,#}, {bitkey∗}
1: Generate the secret permutations pmtvY,#, pmtvU,#,
pmtvV,#, where # ∈ {1, . . . , Npmt1}; Each permutation
table is 20-dim, which is a random permutation of
[−10,−1] ∪ [1, 10].
2: Generate the secret permutations pmtDCLY,#,
pmtDCLU,#, pmtDCLV,#, where # ∈ {1, . . . , Npmt2}.
Each permutation table is 10-dim, which is a random
permutation of [0, 9].
3: Generate six sequences sqnt1∗ and sqnt2∗. The length of
sequences are equal to the block amount of the image
I and the element of sqnt1∗ are the repeat of ENpmt1 .
For instance, if the Npmt1 = 5, and the image have
12 blocks, the sqnt1∗ = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 1, 2}.
Similarly, sqnt2∗ are generated by Npmt2.
4: Parse the image and get the
{{(r∗ij , v∗ij){∗blksizei∗}
blknum∗
i=1
j=1 }, {DC∗i }blknum∗i=1 .
5: for ∀∗ ∈ Y,U, V do
6: for i = 1 : blknum∗ do
7: for j = 1 : blksizei∗ do
8: encv∗ij = pmtv∗,sqnt1∗[i][v
∗
ij ]
9: end for
10: Generate a random bitstream bitdc∗i, then only save
last pmtDCL∗,sqnt2∗ [gDC∗i ] bit as the encDC
∗
i .
11: Compute bitkey∗i = encDC
∗
i ⊕ DC∗i
12: end for
13: Denote all the bitkey∗i as {bitkey∗}
14: The {{(r∗ij , encv∗ij){∗blksizei∗}
blknum∗
i=1
j=1 } and
{encDC∗i }blknum∗i=1 compose encrypted image I ′.
15: end for
Algorithm 6 ImgEnc
Input: Image I , the corresponding IID and Kv
Output: Encrypted image C , ImgPosKey(OID,IID) and
ImgV alKeyOID
1: Randomly generate Kp
2: (I ′i, pmtb∗) = BlockPermut(Ii, {keyblo∗})
3: (I ′′i , {pmtp∗}) = IntraBlockPermut(I ′i, keyinblo∗,#)
4: (C, {bitkey∗}, {pmtDCL∗,#}, {pmtv∗,#}) =
ValueSubstitution(I ′′i , keyv∗, keyl∗, keydc∗)
5: Denote the (pmtb∗, {pmtp∗}, {bitkey∗}) as the
ImgPosKey(OID,IID), denote the ({pmtDCL∗,#},
{pmtv∗,#}) as the ImgV alKeyOID
positions can be substituted with different values, which
helps to resist the statistic attacked [34], [35]. What’s more,
it helps to resist the collusion between image owner and CS
as shown in section 6.
As shown in Algorithm 6, we denote the (pmtb∗,
{pmtp∗}, {bitkey∗}) as the ImgPosKey(OID,IID). For sim-
plicity, the OID and IID will be omitted when there is
no ambiguity or in general reference in the rest of paper.
It should be noticed that all the encryption methods are
high-efficiency bit computation or vector operation. After
encryption, the owner should send the encrypted image
Algorithm 7 TrapGen
Input: Image I , Kv ,
Output: Encrypted query images {COID}
1: for each OID who authoring do
2: Randomly generate a Kp and a {key′blo∗}
3: (I ′i,∼) = BlockPermut(Ii, {keyblo∗})
4: (I ′′i ,∼) = IntraBlockPermut(I ′i, keyinblo∗)
5: (I ′′′i ,∼) = ValueSubstitution(I ′′i , keyv∗, keyl∗, keydc∗)
6: (COID,∼,∼,∼) = BlockPermut(I ′′′i , {key′blo∗})
7: end for
C to the CS, and send the corresponding encryption key
ImgPosKey(OID,IID) to the KMC.
4.1.3 User authorization
When one image owner with identity OID wants to au-
thorize the user, he will give the user ImgV alKeyOID for
the retrieval and decryption. The authorization information
will also be known by CS and KMC. The further operations
during authorization will be introduced in subsection 5.1.2.
4.2 Authorized user Side
The authorized user wants to search the similar images from
the owners who authorize him. As shown in algorithm
7, the user just needs to encrypt the query image with
ImgV alKey he gets from the owners. It is noteworthy that
encrypted query is at last protected by the BlockPermut,
which means the relationship of block is destroyed. After
encryption, authorized user only need to send all the en-
crypted query with corresponding OID as the trapdoor to
CS.
4.3 Cloud Side
After the owners upload the encrypted images, for the
efficiency of retrieval, the CS will extract high-quality en-
crypted feature and further build the index for images in
the database. As the process of index building is similar to
the plaintext situation, we here focus on encrypted feature
extraction and aggregation process.
4.3.1 Global feature extraction from encrypted DC
The gDC is extracted to represent DC information of en-
crypted image [36]. As most values of gDC are concentrated
in [0,9], the CS can extract a 10-dim feature, in which the
jth-dim represents the number of gDC whose value equals
to j. The Y,U,V further form a 30-dim feature vector fDC .
4.3.2 Aggregation feature extraction from the encrypted AC
Different from DC, it is difficult to represent the AC values
in a block effectively by a single number and it makes the
feature aggregation an indispensable step. Inspired by [25],
we use the typical BOW model to aggregate the features.
The kernel observation here is that the encrypted histogram
can still be used to compute the distance and k-means
method BOW [33] uses is robust to the element permuta-
tion. Accordingly, the aggregation for encrypted AC values
consists the following three steps:
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(i) Local histogram extraction. A 40-dim vector is extracted
to represent the feature of encrypted AC in each block,
which is composed by three parts as follow.
fACLocal = Hists ‖ Histv ‖ Histr. (8)
The Hists contains the static information of (r, v) pairs,
including the number of (r, v) pairs, the mean and standard
deviation of r. The Histv is the distribution information
of v. Detailedly, the value of 21-dim is the number of
occurrences of v values in the block range from [-10,10],
and the other 2-dim represents the v values more than 10 or
less than -10. The Histr is the value information of r. The 14
biggest value of r form the vector in descending order. If the
number of (r, v) pairs is less than 14, the unfilled elements
of Histr will be filled by -1.
(ii) Vocabulary generation. Cluster all the local features
into k classes with the k-means clustering algorithm. The k
cluster centers are defined to be the encrypted visual words
which make up the vocabulary. It should be noticed the
Y,U,V are clustered independently as they have different
properties naturally. The selection of k is always a difficult
problem, however, the methods like x-means [37] or gap
statics [38] can effectively cope with the problem. What’s
more, we will show the retrieval accuracy of our scheme is
quite robust to k in Fig. 9.
(iii) Histogram calculation. After generating the vocabu-
lary, all the local histograms in an image are represented
by their nearest visual words. As a result, each image is
represented by a feature vector f = (fi)ki=1. A ”scaled tf-
idf” [39] trick is further implemented to optimize the feature
fY , fU and fV , which means the finally extracted feature
vectors from the (r, v) pairs.
Finally, the image identities and the feature vector make
up a linear index. It is easy to see that the feature vector are
encrypted but the common index building schemes (e.g.,
tree indexing [40]) can be further used.
4.3.3 Search operation
When the CS get the trapdoor generated by the authorized
user, it will extract the same format feature as that from
images in the dataset. If the query is limited in a single
owner, the CS will calculate the feature with the correspond-
ing visual words. Detailedly, the distance are calculated as
formula 9, where D(·, ·) means manhattan distance.
Dis(I1, I2) = α1D(f
DC
I1
, fDCI2 ) + α2D(f
Y
I1
, fYI2)
+α3D(f
U
I1
, fUI2) + α4D(f
V
I1
, fVI2)
(9)
Follow the experience and experiment, we set α1 = 0.1,
α2 = 0.5, α3 = α4 = 0.2.
4.3.4 Search operation from multiple image owners
The above encrypted feature extraction are still valid during
the retrieval as the manhattan distance won’t change if we
execute the same permutation on the elements of feature
vectors. When the multiple permutation tables are used,
the high-frequency values will be randomly substituted
to Npmt different value, where Npmt is the number of
tables. It means if the value frequency distribution of two
images is similar, the frequency of encrypted images will
still have an extent of similarity, although the frequency
become smoother with the increment of Npmt. The distance
becomes weak, however, the magnitude relationship is still
basically kept which is demonstrated experimentally.
It further implies if the images are encrypted by the
permutation tables in same Npmt, the distance after encryp-
tion are still at the same level even though different per-
mutations are utilized for encryption. It means the formula
10 set on if we use the above encryption methods, where
Ienc1 and Ienc2 means the image encrypted with different
ImgV alKey and ImgPosKey.
Dis(Ienc11 , I
enc1
2 ) ≈ Dis(Ienc21 , Ienc22 ) (10)
It should be noticed the indispensable aggregation
schemes will also infect the distance relationship. To keep
the distance can be directly compared, the same cluster
number kg are used to cluster the images from each image
owner. The choice of kg will be discussed in subsection 7.2.2.
When the query contains multi-sources, the CS will
calculate the feature based on each global visual words,
the distance got from different sources will be directly
compared together and images with smaller distance will
be returned.
4.4 KMC side
After CS gets the similar images, it sends the (IID, UID,
OID) to KMC. Here, we follow the operation in [5], the CS
sends encrypted images {C} to the querier and KMC sends
the corresponding {ImgPosKey}. The user will decrypt the
retrieval results according the key he has got. Notably, it
makes users have to interact with the KMC, and actually
leads to two rounds of interaction. We will make up the
drawback in next section.
5 ADVANCED SCHEME
In the previous section, we give the scheme that can sup-
port secure retrieval from multi-source. However, as the
ImgPosKey is directly sent to KMC, it will be fragile to
face the collusion between CS and KMC. Based on the
same reason, the CS and KMC have to interact with user
respectively, which leads to extra interaction for user. In
this section, we firstly propose the scheme for protecting
ImgPosKey to enhance the security and reduce interaction
rounds, then the strategy for group union scene is further
given.
5.1 key protection
Inspired by formula 1, we design a safer scheme with
little computation increment during authorization. Briefly
speaking, to hidden ImgPosKey, each owner with identity
OID constructs a series of key called as UserKeyOID . Like
formula 1, ImgPosKey plays the role of K2, UserKeyOID
plays the role of K1. During authorization, the owner
will generate and send a random UserKeyUIDOID which
is same format with UserKeyOID to the user. For sim-
plicity, the OID will be omitted in UserKeyUIDOID . The
UserKeyUID plays the role of K in formula 1. The work of
computing EncPerm(K1,K) will be undertaken by owner
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during authorization, and the result will be stored by KMC.
KMC undertakes the computation of DecPerm(K2,K1)
during the query. Here we give the construction method
of UserKeyOID.
5.1.1 UserKey generation
To encrypt the ImgPosKey, owner has to consider all the
situation. Detailedly, the owner needs to generate the key
for encrypting the block-permutation key, intra-block per-
mutation key and the stream cipher. Accordingly, a pseudo-
random permutation generator, a stream-cipher generator
and several secret keys are included in the UserKey, i.e.,
Ku = { RandPerm, StmCiph, {keyUblo∗ }, {keyUinblo∗ },
{keyUdc∗} }
Here, the secret keys {keyUblo∗} are utilized to generate
random permutations which are used to encrypt the inter-
block permutation keys. As the length of inter-block permu-
tation is determined by the size of images, it is difficult to
consider all the situation. However, it can be remedied with
a series of permutations whose length are the exponential
of two. For simplicity, we here assume the length of images
denoted as {CommSize} are all under consideration, and
the random permutations are generated as follows:
{Upmtb∗#} ← RandPerm(keyUblo∗, {CommSize}), (11)
where # ∈ {1, . . . , |{CommSize}|}, here |{CommSize}|
is the cardinality of set {CommSize}. Similarity, the secret
keys {keyUinblo∗} are used to protect the intra-block permu-
tations. As the amount of (r, v) pairs is in [1, 63], it can be
generated as follows:
{Upmtp∗#} ← RandPerm(keyUinblo∗, [1, . . . , 63]), (12)
where # ∈ {1, . . . , 63}. At last, the keyUdc∗ is used to
encrypt the bitstream which is computed to decrypt DC.
The streamciphers are generated as follows:
{UbitKey∗#} ← StmCiph(keyUdc∗, [1, . . . , 10]), (13)
where # ∈ {1, . . . , 10}. The whole ({Upmtb∗#},
{Upmtp∗#} and {UbitKey∗#}) is finally denoted as the
UserKey.
5.1.2 Image position Key encryption
Different from subsection 4.1.2, after the encryption of an
image, the image owner won’t directly send ImgPosKey
to KMC. As the Algorithm 8, the image owner will use the
UserKeyOID to encrypt the ImgPosKey, and then send
ImgPosKey′ = ImgKeyEnc(ImgPosKey, UserKeyOID to
KMC. It should be noticed UserKey is unique to each
image owner, and it will not be exposed to anyone else.
The encrypted key ImgPosKey′ are the same format with
ImgPosKey.
When the owner authorizes an user, he randomly gener-
ates a UserKeyUID and send to the authorized user. Then
owner will use UserKeyUID to encrypt the UserKeyOID
for following retrieval. As Algorithm 9 shows, the
owner executes UserKeyEnc(UserKeyOID, UserKeyUID),
and sends the result UserKey(OID,UID) to KMC.
Algorithm 8 ImgKeyEnc
Input: ImgPosKeyIID, UserKeyOID
Output: ImgPosKey′IID
1: for ∀ pmtp∗j ∈ pmtp∗ do
2: seek same length permutation Upmtp∗j in Upmtp∗#
3: pmtp′∗j = DecPerm(pmtp∗j , Upmtp∗j)
4: end for
5: for ∀ ∗ ∈ {H,S, V } do
6: seek same length permutation Upmtb∗j in Upmtb∗#
7: pmtb′∗ = DecPerm(pmtb∗, Upmtb∗j)
8: end for
9: for ∀ bitkeyi∗ ∈ {bitkey∗} do
10: seek same length bit-stream Ubitkey in Ubitkey′∗#
11: bitkey′i∗ = bitkeyi∗ ⊕ Ubitkey
12: end for
13: denote the (pmtb′∗, {pmtp′∗}, {bitkey′i}) as the
ImgPosKey′.
Algorithm 9 UserKeyEnc/UserKeyDec
Input: UserKeyOID, UserKeyUID
Output: UserKey(OID,UID)
1: for ∀ UpmtbOID∗j ∈ UpmtbOID∗# do
2: seek same length permutation UpmtbUID∗j in
UpmtbUID∗#
3: Upmtb∗j=EncPerm/DecPerm(UpmtbOID∗j , Upmtb
UID
∗j )
4: end for
5: for ∀ UpmtpOID∗j ∈ UpmtpOID∗# do
6: seek same length permutation UpmtpUID∗j in
UpmtpUID∗#
7: Upmtp∗j=EncPerm/DecPerm(UpmtpOID∗j , Upmtp
UID
∗j )
8: end for
9: for ∀ UbitkeyOID∗j ∈ UbitkeyOID∗# do
10: seek same length bitstream UbitkeyUID∗j in
UbitkeyUID∗#
11: Ubitkeyi=UbitkeyOIDi ⊕ UbitkeyUIDi
12: end for
denote ({Upmtb∗#}, {Upmtp∗#}, {UbitKey∗#}) as
UserKey(OID,UID)
When CS asks the secret key from KMC, KMC will com-
pute EncImgPosKey′IID = ImgKeyEnc(ImgPosKey
′
IID,
UserKey(OID,UID)), and send back to CS. CS will fi-
nally send back encrypted images {C} and correspond-
ing EncImgPosKey′IID to the authorized user. From for-
mula 1, it is easy to notice that the authorized user can
get the encryption key with the help of ImgV alKey,
EncImgPosKey′ and UserKeyUIDOID .
5.2 Group Union
Inspired by [5], the situation that owners unite as a group is
further considered. In [5], the creator creates a repository in
the CS, and the member join in should use the ImgV alKey
creator set to encrypt their images, and further upload
them into the repository. It will lead to plenty of extra
consumption when owner wants to join different groups.
Inspired by formula 2, we accomplish the union by some
increment keys. The process of union is shown like figure 3.
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Fig. 3: The process of group union
When the owners unite as the group, they should
firstly choose a trusty member or third party as
the group organizer. Similar to the image owner, the
group organizer will randomly generate UserKeyGID
and ImgV alKeyGID, then send them to all the mem-
bers in group. After getting these information, to
meet the demand of decryption for users who autho-
rized by the group organizer, the members will com-
pute IncUsrKey(OID,GID) = UserKeyDec(UserKeyOID,
UserKeyGID), and send the result to KMC. Similarly, in or-
der to meet the demand of retrieval, the members will com-
pute all the DecPerm(pmtvOID∗,# , pmtv
GID
∗,# ) and DecPerm(
pmtDCLOID∗,# , pmtDCL
GID
∗,# ), the results can be denoted as
IncV alKey(OID,GID) then send it to CS. Based on formula
2, the CS could further execute the encryption on encrypted
images, then the CS further executes the same operation in
subsection 4.3. The (r, v) part linear index of images for one
image owner in CS will be finally built like Table 2.
The group organizer undertakes the task of authoriza-
tion. Besides the UserKeyUIDGID , the group organizer
should use the symmetric encryption to avoid the potential
collusion risk (shown in subsection 6.2.4). Here we briefly
use the AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) [41]. In this
case, after the authorization, the group organizer will send
UserKey(UIDGID,GID) and K(GID,UID)k to KMC.
During the retrieval from group, CS will com-
pute the similarity with the feature belong to the
group, and then send (GID, UID, {OID}, {IID})
to KMC. Based on GID and OID, KMC can seek
the corresponding IncUsrKey. Then KMC will firstly
compute ImgKeyEnc(ImgPosKey, IncUsrKey) based on
IID. Then, same to single owner, KMC computes
EncImgPosKey′ based on the UserKey(GID,UID). At last,
AES encryption based on corresponding K(GID,UID)k will
be executed on EncImgPosKey′, and the result will be
sent back to CS. It is easy to notice the user can finish the
decryption based on these information.
5.3 Update operation
After introducing all the entites, the update operations in
JES-MSIR are given here. Detailly, We will show the update
on images and owners.
Image addition: As the section 3, based on his
ImgV alKey and random ImgPosKey, the owner can
get the encrypted image and sends it to CS. Simi-
larly, based on the UserKey, the owner will compute
ImgKeyEnc(ImgPosKey, UserKey) and send it to KMC.
The CS will execute the feature extraction by existing visual
words, and add this image into the index. The KMC will
store the key for following retrieval.
Image deletion: The owner with identity GID sends
IID to CS and KMC. Then CS should delete the correspond-
ing encrypted image and all the feature in the index, KMC
should delete the corresponding ImgPosKey′(OID,IID)
Join group: The group organizer in the group with
identity GID sends its UserKeyGID and ImgV alKeyGID
to the new member, then the member, CS and KMC will
execute same operation in subsection 5.2.
Leave group: The group organizer in the group with
identity GID sends the OID to CS and KMC. Then CS
should delete the corresponding image features which are
extracted for the owner and group, KMC should delete the
IncUsrKey(OID,GID)
6 SECURITY ANALYSIS
Besides the security problems in PPCBIR [5], [25], MSPPIR
[4] also faces the risk from the collusion from different
untities. The security analysis in the non-collusion assump-
tion, including Ciphertext-Only Attack (COA) and Known-
Background Attack (KBA), will be firstly given in subsection
6.1, then we analysis the potential collusion problems in
subsection 6.2, finally the security comparison with previous
schemes in MSPPIR are given in subsection 6.3.
6.1 Security with no Collusion
6.1.1 Security under COA model
In the COA model, the adversary is only able to get the
ciphertext. As the images are all stored in the CS, we
here mainly consider the potential leakage in the CS. For
formal statement, the functionality F and the correspond-
ing information leakages of our scheme under the COA
model are summarized in Fig. 4. Our security proofs follow
the paradigm in secure multi-party computations [42]. The
execution of our scheme involves the interaction between
CS and other entities, which is defined as real experiment.
In the proposed scheme, the honest-but-curious CS is the
potential adversaryA. In an ideal experiment, a simulator S
is defined as the one that can simulate the view of adversary
A by using functionality F only, constructing the ideal
experiment. The proposed scheme is proved secure once the
two experiments are indistinguishable.
Theorem 1. Our scheme is secure against an honest-but-
curious probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary under the
COA model. The security strength depends on the image size, and
the number of permutations in ImgValKey.
Proof.
• Security of image content. As the Fig. 4, the simulator S
simulates a set of images IS , and the corresponding
identity set IIDS according to the storage leakage
as shown in Fig. . The simulator S knows the total
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TABLE 2: Partial linear index built for one image owner
Image
Identity
Feature vector aggregated from (r, v) pairs for different authorized users
OwnerOID GlobalOID GroupGID1 GlobalGID1 . . .
IID(C1) fOID1 = {fOID1j }kOIDj=1 fOID1G = {fOID1jg }
kg
j=1 f
GID1
1 = {fGID11j }
kGID1
j=1 f
GID1
1G = {fGID11jg }
kg
j=1 . . .
. . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . .
IID(Ci) f
OID
i = {fOIDij }kOIDj=1 fOIDiG = {fOIDijg }
kg
j=1 f
GID1
i = {fGID1ij }
kGID1
j=1 f
GID1
iG = {fGID1ijg }
kg
j=1 . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IID(Cn) fOIDn = {fOIDnj }kOIDj=1 fOIDnG = {fOIDnjg }
kg
j=1 f
GID1
n = {fGID1nj }
kGID1
j=1 f
GID1
nG = {fGID1njg }
kg
j=1 . . .
The mainly ideal functionality F of our scheme as well as the corresponding information leakages.
(i) F .StoreImage(I, UID, IID,Kp,Kv):
• Functionality. Each image owner encrypts all his images in I, and generates a set of encrypted images C. Next,
each image owner uploads C, UID, IID to the CS.
• Storage leakage. The information leaked here includes C, IID, UID and the size of each images, and the
total number of images. What’s more, the CS know the corresponding blocks are encrypted by the same
valuesubstitution table.
(ii) F .Union(OID, GID, {IncV alKey}):
• Functionality. Image owners union as a group, and sends the IncV alKey to the CS.
• Relation leakage. The information leaked here includes the OID in the same group, and the increment key
itself. What’s more, the CS can compute the difference of ImgV alKey belong to the owner in the same group.
(iii) F .IndexGen(C,UID,GID):
• Functionality. CS extracts local histograms from images blocks belong to each image owner, and constructs
the vocabulary by cluster algorithm, and calculates the feature vectors for each image in C based on the
corresponding UID and GID like Table 2.
• Feature leakage. The information leaked here includes the encrypted local histograms, the similarities and
distributions of local histograms belong to the same source.
(iv) F .Query({Iq,UID,GID}):
• Functionality. Authorized user encrypts the query image, and submits the encrypted images to cloud server
as trapdoor. The CS execute the similarity calculation, and get the {IID} of similar image, and ask KMC the
corresponding decryption key. The CS finally return all the {UID/GID, C, EncImgPosKey′} to querier.
• Query leakage. The information leaked here includes the encrypted query images and the similarity between
the images in the database. The information that encrypted images are encrypted from the same image is also
leaked.
Fig. 4: The functionality F and the information leakage in our framework
number of images and the size of each image. How-
ever, S can only fill the images with the randomly
generated pixels. As stated above, JPEG-format im-
ages are mainly consisted by the DC values and
(r, v) pairs, both of which are contained in all Y,U, V
components. In our scheme, the above information
is protected respectively by the substitutions and
random permutations with different keys. The v
information between the real images and simulated
ones are indistinguishable according to the property
of random permutation. For a random permutation
with length of 20, the computational complexity of
a distinguisher D, executed by S , in distinguishing
the color values is 20! because D needs to figure
out the correct one from 20! permutations, which
means a log2(20!) ≈ 61 bits security strength. The
information of r is protected by block permutation
and intra-block permutation. The security strengths
of block permutation and intra-block permutation
are equal to log2(blknum!) and log2(blksize!) bits,
respectively. The DC values is protected by the sub-
stitutions and bitxor by a random bit-stream. The
security strengths of bitxor are equal to n, where
n means the length of random bit-stream. The im-
age content is made up of all of these information
and hence the security strength of image encryption
SecImg in our scheme can be calculated as:
SecImg =3×Npmt1 × log2(20!)
+
∑
log2(blknum∗!)
+3×
∑ blknum∗∑
i=1
log2(blksizei!)
+3×Npmt2 × log2(10!)
+
∑ blknum∗∑
i=1
ni(bits)
(14)
• Security of features. In our scheme, image features
are mainly calculated from the local histograms of
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encrypted DC and (r, v) pairs. With a simulated
image IS , S can calculate the local histograms of
the simulated image. The computational complexity
of a distinguisher D in distinguishing the histogram
is 3 × Npmt1 × log2(20!) + 3 × Npmt2 × log2(10!)
which means about 642 bits security strength if we
set Npmt1 = Npmt2 = 5
• Security of query image and feature. As algorithm
7 shows, all queries are encrypted by different
ImgPosKey and ImgV alKey. The one-time pad
encryption makes the multiple C the same security
level with single one. As the query is firstly en-
crypted like algorithm 6, which makes the security
of query not less than images in CS. What’s more,
the extra BlockPerm avoids the leakage of relation
between the encrypted blocks.
The images are encrypted by the combination of block
permutation, intra-block permutation, value substitution
and bitxor in JES-MSIR. Although the security is partly de-
pending on the image size, the efficiency advantage makes
this kind of encryption more suitable for images compare to
the methods based on HE [22].
6.1.2 Security under KBA model
In the KBA model, besides the information leakage defined
in Fig. 4, the adversary also knows certain statistical proper-
ties of natural images, which degrades the security strength
of the proposed scheme. For example, as illustrated in the
first subfigure of Fig. 5, v values do not occur uniformly, and
the small v value generally has much higher frequency. Af-
ter substitution with a single table, the histogram bins have
been shuffled, which protects the image statistical features
to some extent. However, the distribution statistics are still
reserved as shown in the second subfigure of Fig. 5, which
decreases the computational complexity to figure out the
secret permutation. In our scheme, the polyalphabetic cipher
is utilized to encrypt the pixel values, which will flatten the
v value histogram of the encrypted image and thus offering
stronger security. Although the histogram become flatten,
the size relation of retrieval distance are approximate kept.
It is clearly a trade-off between the security and retrieval
accuracy. In this paper, we set Npmt1 = Npmt2 = 5.
6.2 Security under Collusion
In the above analysis, we prove our scheme is safe if each
participant in the system is reliable. However, a reasonable
system should be robust to the collusion between users. As
the image sotred in CS, we skip the analysis of collusion
between KMC and member in group or user.
6.2.1 The collusion between CS and KMC
Colluding CS and KMC own the knowledge of the en-
crypted images and encrypted key. The security of en-
crypted images has been shown in COA model, here we
further prove KMC can not infer the ImgPosKey from
encrypted keys.
As formula 1 shows, to the EncPerm and DecPerm, there
are n! possible permutations for n elements. It means if
all K , K1, K2 are unknown, it is indistinguishable to in-
fer them from the DecPerm(K2,K1) and EncPerm(K1,K)
Fig. 5: Occurrence ratios of v values of original image and
its encrypted versions with different Npmt1. [25]
only. Here the ImgPosKey is unknown as subsection 6.1,
UserKeyOID are kept in the owner side, and UserKeyUID
are stored in the authorized user side. As both CS and KMC
is unfamiliar to the above information, it is difficult for them
to infer ImgPosKey(OID,IID) from UserKey(OID,UID)
and ImgPosKey
′
(OID,IID). In an ideal environment (i.e.
non-collusion), the CS and KMC can be undertaken by one
server.
6.2.2 The collusion between CS and authorized users
Colluding CS and AU have the knowledge of known de-
crypted images and ImgV alKeyOID , which means the
features are exposed. However, the images stored in CS
are encrypted one-time pad ImgPosKey, in this case, the
colluder can’t obtain the unknown images. As the features
of owner is meaningless to authorized users, it will further
decrease the possibility of collusion.
6.2.3 The collusion between CS, KMC and a separate im-
age owner
The image owner may try to know more images from other
image owners through colluding with the CS. As different
owner use different ImgV alKey, we here mainly consider
the potential colluding risk on the AU who authorized by
conspirator and other image owners.
As Algorithm 7 shows, each encrypted query is finally
protected by BlockPerm, which means the conspirator can
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not get the block relation between the queries. Take v for
instance, as we use multi-table in the ValueSubstitution,
which means each block may be encrypted by Npmt2 possi-
bilities. The owner can not infer the plaintext query feature
in that there are (Npmt2)blknum possibilities for a image
which has blknum blocks. It further means the collusion
with one image owner will not expose ImgV alKey of the
image owners authorized to the same user. As KMC has no
information related to ImgV alKey, this kind of collusion
will not leak the plaintext image.
6.2.4 The collusion between CS and member in the group
After collusion, CS has the knowledge of ImgV alKeyGID
and UserKeyGID, which makes the image feature belong
to the group exposed. However, as the ImgPosKey is one-
time-pad, it can not be directly exposed. Further, the key
KMC sends to CS is encrypted by AES if it corresponding
to a group, which means CS actually has no information
related to UserKeyGID. So the position information of
image is still secure in this situation.
6.3 The security comparison
Here we compare the security with the former paper from
the respective of image content and image feature, and the
conclusion can be seen in table 3. In [3], to avoid the key
conversion during image decryption, the KMC decrypts
and gets the plaintext image, which makes their scheme
insecure. In [4], the feature security depends on a global
key, which can be got by colluding CS and KMC.
7 EXPERIMENT RESULTS
The section evaluates the performance of the proposed
scheme in terms of encryption effectiveness, retrieval ac-
curacy and efficiency. We implement the proposed scheme
with Matlab 2018a on a Windows 10 operation system. All
the experiment in the user side (i.e. source and authorized
user) are executed in an machine with Intel Core i5-8250u
CPU @ 1.6GHZ and 16GB memory. The experiment in the
Cloud side (i.e. CS or KMC) are executed on a machine with
Intel Core i7-6900K CPU @ 3.20GHz and 64 GB memory.
We firstly use the common used Corel-1k image dataset [43]
as the experiment dataset. The images in this dataset size
either 384×256 or 256×384. The image dataset includes 10
categories of images and each category contains 100 similar
images.
7.1 Upload/Update consumption
In this section, we focus on the time consumption in
the image owner side. Generally speaking, in the existing
schemes, the image owner needs to execute the following
sub-operation: Image encryption, Feature extraction, Feature
aggregation, Feature encryption. The time consumption com-
parison on uploading Corel-1k dataset is shown in Table 4.
Benefiting from the simple encryption scheme, the [5] and
[6] is in high efficiency. Suffering from the high computation
complexity of FHE, the encryption on feature is also an
expensive operation in [4].
Further, the image owner have the need for updating
their image. The existing schemes execute the following sub-
operation during update: Image update, Feature update. The
time consumption in update is shown as Table 5. The update
operation in [3], [5], [6], and JES-MSIR is similar with the
uploading. In [4], the image owner only needs to generate
the feature based on existing visual words. However, it still
leads to a costly update.
The time consumption of transferring the image to the
CS and the following operation on the encrypted images is
almost linear to the size of encrypted image, we further give
the size of encrypted image information in Table 6. The size
of encrypted image in [3], [4] are equal to plaintext. Fig. 6
illustrates the separate and joint effect of the three protecting
steps. It should be noticed that the multiple permutations
lead to more uniform encrypted pixels.
Fig. 6: The visual effect of encryption, (a) the original image
(133.jpg in Corel-1k database), the size of which is 384×256,
(b) with block permutation only, (c) with intra-block
permutation only, (d) with value substitution only, (e) with
value substitution under Npmt1,pmt2 = 1, (f) with value
substitution under Npmt1,pmt2 = 5.
7.2 Retrieval Consumption and Precision
In our experiments, the ”precision” for a query is defined
as that in [44]: Pm = m′/m, where m′ is the number of
real similar images in the m retrieved images. We choose
all 10 categories to test the retrieval precision and time
consumption.
7.2.1 single-source
During the retrieval, the time consumption are composed
by three part: Trapdoor generation, similarity consumption in
cloud side, decryption. The time consumption comparison on
retrieval(return Top-50 similar images) is shown as 7. Due
to the leakage of index, the similarity computation in [6] is
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TABLE 3: Security comparison
JES-MSIR MIPP [3] PIC [4]
content feature content feature content feature
No Collusion yes yes no no yes yes
Colluding CS and KMC yes yes no no yes no
Colluding CS and User yes no no no yes yes
Colluding CS, KMC and seperate Owner yes yes no no yes no
Colluding CS and member yes no - - - -
TABLE 4: Time consumption of image dataset upload
JES-MSIR Cheng [6] IES-CBIR [5] MIPP [3] PIC [4]
Image encryption 90.1s 79.07s 47.66s 2.51s 2.7s
Feature extraction - - - 13s 77.43s
Feature aggregation - - - - 200.3s
Feature encryption - - - 6.7s 1228.8s
Total time consumption 90.1s 79.07s 47.66s 22.21s 1509.23s
TABLE 5: Time consumption of image update
JES-MSIR Cheng [6] IES-CBIR [5] MIPP [3] PIC [4]
Image update 0.09s 0.08s 0.05s 0.03s 0.04s
Feature update - - - 0.02s 7.35s
Total time consumption 0.09s 0.08s 0.05s 0.05s 7.39s
TABLE 6: The size increment of the encrypted image dataset
Plaintext JES-MSIR Cheng [6] IES-CBIR [5]
Corel-1k dataset 32.3MB 57.1MB 40.5MB 268MB
Fig. 7: Retrieval accuracy comparison in Corel-1k dataset
unacceptable. The retrieval consumption in [4] depends on
the codebook utilized as their scheme only compare with
images in the same index each time.
The retrieval accuracy comparison is shown as Fig. 7.
Due to the fully utilization of DC and (r, v) pairs and
aggregation on local (r, v) pairs, the accuracy of JES-MSIR is
better than [5], [6]. As the typical feature (e.g. SIFT) relies on
effective aggregation schemes [45], the accuracy in [4] is not
outstanding. However, more effective aggregation methods
always lead to heavier computation consumption which
will be undertaken by the owner himself in the schemes
belong to first category.
7.2.2 multi-source
To better show the result in multi-source scene, Corel-10k
image dataset [46] are utilized in multi-source scene. This
image database includes 100 categories of images and each
category contains 100 similar images. The size of image is
either 187×126 or 126×187. We choose all 100 categories to
test the retrieval precision and time consumption. In our
experiment, the images in Corel-10k dataset are randomly
distributed to each image owner, and all the image owners
possess the whole 10,000 images.
The retrieval time consumption are similar to the situa-
tion in single-source. Although our scheme needs to encrypt
multiple queries, however, the time of trapdoor generation
is far less than the other steps. Specially, the interaction
rounds during the retrieval are shown in TABLE 8. The
interaction between CS and KMC in [4] is unsure in that
they can not ensure two rounds of interaction can search
enough similar images.
Figure. 8 uses the Corel-10k database shows the retrieval
accuracy comparison in the single-source scene. When
Nsource (i.e. the number of source) increases, the accuracy
of [3] will kept same as the feature they use kept same;
the accuracy of [4] will have an extent of change as the
image owners jointly maintain the same codebook. When
the images significantly increase, the quality of codebook
will infect the accuracy, the influence is basically same as
the plaintext image retrieval [47]. It should be noticed it is
unrobust as the alternation of codebook needs the participa-
tion of image owners.
In JES-MSIR, as mentioned in subsection 4.3.4, the dis-
tance are still in the same level if the same number of cluster
centers are chosen. To choose reasonable kg for the system,
we firstly use grid search to choose the approximately
optimal kgrid for the 1-source (kY = 200, kU = 50, kV = 50.
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TABLE 7: Time consumption of retrieval(Top-50)
JES-MSIR Cheng [6] IES-CBIR [5] MIPP [3] PIC [4]
Trapdoor generation 0.09s 0.08s 0.05s 0.03s 15.36s
similarity computation in cloud 0.11s 75.63s 0.15s 2.63s >600s
Decryption 4.43s 3.92s 2.44s 1.28s 1.31s
Total time consumption 4.63s 79.63s 2.64s 3.94s >616.67s
TABLE 8: Interaction rounds during the retrieval
JES-MSIR MIPP [3] PIC [4]
CS and KMC 1 1 ≥2
CS and User 1 1 1
KMC and User 0 1 0
Fig. 8: Retrieval accuracy comparison in Corel-10k dataset
Then we use the kgird as the kg to test the situation on
different Nsource. Further, the two, ten, half, tenth times of
kgrid are utilized as kg to test the robustness.
As shown in Fig. 9, three conclusions can be seen. Firstly,
the retrieval accuracy decrease in a slow speed in the same
choice of cluster number. For instance, the retrieval accuracy
(Top-50) only decrease 7.3% whenNsource increase from 1 to
1,000. It means even in a extreme situation (i.e. each image
owner has average 10 images), the retrieval accuracy still
stable. And the decrease ratio is decline with the increment
of returned images as shown in Fig. 10. Secondly, small
increment of k is beneficial to accuracy. For instance, two
times kgrid get better accuracy when Nsource over 500. Last
but not least, the change on kg show little influence on the
results. It should be noticed that only 10% accuracy loss
when the 10 times kgrid in utilization. And the accuracy is
still better than [4] even in extreme situation (i.e. kY =20,
kU=5, kV =5).
As most of methods which can infer the ksug need
consume plenty of resources when the feature is huge. In
this case, only part of feature are randomly chosen from the
original feature as an optimization in our experiment, and
the proportion of chosen feature can be briefly called ratio,
where ratio ∈ (0, 1]. Gap statics [38] method is employed in
the experiment to get the ksug . A sublinear speed is gotten
when the number of image decline. Consider all the above
factors comprehensively, we here suggest the kg chosen as
ksuggest = 1Nsource (
∑Nsource
i=1 k
i
sug) · log2(1 + 1ratio ) · log2(1 +
Nsource). The result is shown in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10, it could be
noticed appropriate accuracy and slower decline can be got
in different Nsource. What’s more, as all the index building
is undertaken by CS, it is easy for CS to update the kg at
regular intervals.
Fig. 9: Top-50 accuracy comparison in different choice of k
Fig. 10: Retrieval accuracy decrease ratio in different Top-m
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce the multi-source privacy-
preserving CBIR problem and propose a novel scheme
which can effectively and securely cope with this prob-
lem. Different from the previous schemes which use the
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homomorphic encryption, we propose our scheme based on
the randomization encryption, which leads to a higher effi-
ciency and acceptable accuracy and security. The bitxor and
permutation are used to ensure the security of the image,
and the BOW model is used to aggregte the encrypted (r, v)
pairs in multi-source scene. As the retrieval accuracy is still
insufficient when compared with that in plaintext domain,
in the future, we consider to execute the state-of-art CBIR
scheme in safety based on two non-collusion CS.
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